Egypt returned to the Internet
about 09:30 GMT today (2 February 2011).
This sudden return after being as suddenly disconnected
one week ago (27 January 2011)
is obviously not due to ordinary causes such as congestion,
cable cut, or router failure.
This political disconnection of an entire country does not seem
to have helped the regime responsible for it; quite the opposite.
On 27 January 2011 the Egyptian government cut off cell phone and
Internet access to the outside world.
Here’s what routing looked like to six destinations inside Egypt
as that happened.
PerilWatch has further detail.
Craig Labovitz just gave
an interesting talk
about botnet data derived from Arbor Network customers
enabling anonymous data (37 ISPs over last 12 months),
of 5,000 events classified by operators.
60% of DDoS attacks are by flooding.
Yet most attacks involve few IP addresses; indicates address spoofing.
Slight problem: only 1/4 of customers have enabled anonymous data.
“Real goal of this talk is to encourage participation.”
On April 25, 1997, millions of people in North America lost access to all of the Internet for about an hour. The hijacking was caused by an employee misprogramming a router, a computer that directs data traffic, at a small Internet service provider.
A similar incident happened elsewhere the next year, and the one after that. Routing errors also blocked Internet access in different parts of the world, often for millions of people, in 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008 and 2009. Last month a Chinese Internet service provider halted access from around the world to a vast number of sites, including Dell.com and CNN.com, for about 20 minutes.
In 2008, Pakistan Telecom tried to comply with a government order to prevent access to YouTube from the country and intentionally “black-holed” requests for YouTube videos from Pakistani Internet users. But it also accidentally told the international carrier upstream from it that “I’m the best route to YouTube, so send all YouTube traffic to me.” The upstream carrier accepted the routing message, and passed it along to other carriers across the world, which started sending all requests for YouTube videos to Pakistan Telecom. Soon, even Internet users in the U.S. were deprived of videos of singing cats and skateboarding dogs for a few hours.
In 2004, the flaw was put to malicious use when someone got a computer in Malaysia to tell Internet service providers that it was part of Yahoo Inc. A flood of spam was sent out, appearing to come from Yahoo.
Here’s an example of some Internet routing in Iran, in this case on the way to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Monday 15 June 2009. Normally, routing and latency don’t change much.
Starting Saturday 13 June, the day after the election, routing and latency
have become increasingly disturbed. More here.
Rodney Van Meter, co-teaching a class by Jun Murai, posts notes
on why Albert-László Barabási (ALB) is both right and wrong about
the Internet (it is more or less a scale-free network when considered
as a network of Autonomous Systems (AS), but contrary to ALB's assumption John Doyle and others have pointed out that the bigger nodes are not central, an AS as a node would be somewhat
difficult to take out all at once, there are both higher and lower
layer topologies that make the Internet more robust, and
the Internet's biggest problem isn't topology at all:
The most serious risks to the Internet are not to individual
"nodes" (ASes), but rather stem from the near-monocropping of
Internet infrastructure and end nodes, and the vulnerability of the
system to human error (and political/economic considerations):
For that matter, the Internet's ability to reroute has been very
useful to ameliorate topological link breaks at the physical layer,
for example undersea cables in the Mediterranean Sea twice last year.
Why it’s not good to depend on common sense for really big perils:
The models these companies created differed from peril to peril, but they
all had one thing in common: they accepted that the past was an imperfect
guide to the future. No hurricane has hit the coast of Georgia, for
instance, since detailed records have been kept. And so if you relied
solely on the past, you would predict that no hurricane ever will hit the
Georgia coast. But that makes no sense: the coastline above, in South
Carolina, and below, in Florida, has been ravaged by storms. You are
dealing with a physical process, says Robert Muir-Wood, the chief
scientist for R.M.S. There is no physical reason why Georgia has not been
hit. Georgias just been lucky. To evaluate the threat to a Georgia beach
house, you need to see through Georgias luck. To do this, the R.M.S.
modeler creates a history that never happened: he uses what he knows about
actual hurricanes, plus what he knows about the forces that create and
fuel hurricanes, to invent a 100,000-year history of hurricanes. Real
history serves as a guide it enables him to see, for instance, that the
odds of big hurricanes making landfall north of Cape Hatteras are far
below the odds of them striking south of Cape Hatteras. It allows him to
assign different odds to different stretches of coastline without making
the random distinctions that actual hurricanes have made in the last 100
years. Generate a few hundred thousand hurricanes, and you generate not
only dozens of massive hurricanes that hit Georgia but also a few that
hit, say, Rhode Island.
Sure, the Georgia coast doesn’t have any single concentration of wealth
But it does have a swath of wealth that could be taken down by a single storm.
And complacent owners who think it can’t ever happen,
people in Thailand didn’t believe
Smith Dharmasaroja before the 2004 Tsunami.