Tag Archives: TPRC

Spam and Botnet Reputation Randomized Control Trials and Policy @ TPRC 41

How to do a ranking when you can’t present a rank list: use a distribution graph. Also how to do a randomized control trial when there are active enemy agents: five ways to find out if and how much they are affecting the results. This was in my apparently annual talk at TPRC 41, the Telecommunications Policy Research Conference in Arlington, Virginia.

With slides, abstract, full paper, and video. The sound is not good, though; it was taken with my smartphone. Why don’t conferences do their own video and put it on the web? There were a few sensitive presentations at this one, but they were few, and the rest could have gone up. They didn’t, so I got somebody to video with my phone.


Preston Padden @ TPRC 41

Not your typical TPRC speaker. His heroes include “risk takers” Rupert Murdoch and Pat Buchanan, but not Ted Turner. Netflix was not mentioned. I was the first (but not the last) to stand up to question what he said.

His heroes include risk takers Rupert Murdoch and Pat Buchanan, but not Ted Turner. Netflix was not mentioned.
Picture by John S. Quarterman, 27 September 2013.


Reputation as Public Policy for Internet Security @ TPRC 2012

Saturday I presented Reputation as Public Policy for Internet Security Cover at the 40th Telecommunications Research Policy Conference (TPRC) hosted by George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, VA. Attendees seemed to appreciate our efforts to deal with heteroskedasticity with a wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure. The presentation, along with the abstract and the paper, are available from the SpamRankings.net website.

Blog readers will notice the TPRC presentation excerpted Festi Up Grum botnet is staging a comeback and extended Festi botnet infesting the world, July 2012 as well as making use of the numerous medical posts, while attempting to pull that and other material together in aid of motivating and describing the intended field experiments and their potential policy implications. As Prof. Andrew B. Whinston said to Network World a couple of months ago:

We’re not trying to solve the spam issue. We’re trying to deal with the broader issue of whether companies should publicly report security issues.