Category Archives: Medical

Krebs on SpamRankings.net

Brian Krebs wrote on his blog, Naming & Shaming Sources of Spam:
A new resource for spotlighting organizations that are unwittingly contributing to the global spam problem aims to shame junk email havens into taking more aggressive security measures.

SpamRankings.net is a project launched by the Center for Research in Electronic Commerce at the University of Texas at Austin. Its goal is to identify and call attention to organizations with networks that have been infiltrated by spammers.

Andrew Whinston, the center’s director, said the group initially is focusing on health care providers that appear to be infected with spam bots. “Nobody wants to do business with a bank or hospital or Internet hosting company that has been hijacked by spammers,” Whinston said. “It’s an environment in which user data can be stolen or compromised.”

The rest of his writeup quotes me quite a bit, and everyone knows I’m quite shy, so please go read his blog!

I will add that May data is live now on SpamRankings.net. Also, organizations that do better over time may want to brag, as has happened with a couple of U.S. organizations in May.

Here’s Krebs’ final paragraph:

I applaud this effort, and hope that it gains traction. I remain convinced that the Internet community would benefit from a more comprehensive and centralized approach to measuring badness on the Web. There are many existing efforts to measure reputation and to quantify badness online, but most of those projects seek to enumerate very specific threats (such spam or hacked Web sites) and measure the problem from a limited vantage point. What is lacking is an organization that attempts to collate data collected by these disparate efforts and to publish that information in near real-time.

-jsq

Quis custodiet ipsos medici?

Internet security is in a position similar to that of safety in the medical industry. Many doctors have an opinion like this one, quoted by Kent Bottles:
“Only 33% of my patients with diabetes have glycated hemoglobin levels that are at goal. Only 44% have cholesterol levels at goal. A measly 26% have blood pressure at goal. All my grades are well below my institution’s targets.” And she says, “I don’t even bother checking the results anymore. I just quietly push the reports under my pile of unread journals, phone messages, insurance forms, and prior authorizations.”

Meanwhile, according to the CDC, 99,000 people die in the U.S. per year because of health-care associated infections. That is equivalent of an airliner crash every day. It’s three times the rate of deaths by automobile accidents.

The basic medical error problems observed by Dennis Quaid when his twin babies almost died due to repeated massive medically-administered overdoses and due to software problems such as ably analysed by Nancy Leveson for the infamous 1980s Therac-25 cancer-radiation device are not in any way unique to computing in medicine. The solutions to those problems are analogous to some of the solutions IT security needs: measurements plus six or seven layers of aggregation, analysis, and distribution.

As Gardiner Harris reported in the New York Times, August 20, 2010, another problem is that intravenous and feeding tubes are not distinguished by shape or color: Continue reading

What we can learn from the Therac-25

What does Nancy Leveson’s classic analysis of the Therac-25 recommend? (“An Investigation of the Therac-25 Accidents,” by Nancy Leveson, University of Washington and Clark S. Turner, University of California, Irvine, IEEE Computer, Vol. 26, No. 7, July 1993, pp. 18-41.)
“Inadequate Investigation or Followup on Accident Reports. Every company building safety-critical systems should have audit trails and analysis procedures that are applied whenever any hint of a problem is found that might lead to an accident.” p. 47

“Government Oversight and Standards. Once the FDA got involved in the Therac-25, their response was impressive, especially considering how little experience they had with similar problems in computer-controlled medical devices. Since the Therac-25 events, the FDA has moved to improve the reporting system and to augment their procedures and guidelines to include software. The input and pressure from the user group was also important in getting the machine fixed and provides an important lesson to users in other industries.” pp. 48-49

The lesson being that you have to have built-in audit, reporting, transparency, and user visibility for reputation.

Which is exactly what Dennis Quaid is asking for.

Remember, most of those 99,000 deaths a year from medical errors aren’t due to control of complicated therapy equipment: Continue reading

What about the Therac-25?

Someone suggested that Dennis Quaid should be reminded of the Therac-25 “if he thinks computers will reduce risk without a huge investment in quality, quality assurance and operational analysis.” For readers who may not be familiar with it, the Therac-25 was a Canadian radiation-therapy device of the 1980s that was intended to treat cancer. It had at least six major accidents and caused three fatalities, because of poor software design and development.

Why should anyone assume Dennis Quaid doesn’t know that quality assurance and operational analysis are needed for anything designed or controled by software? The man is a jet pilot, and thus must be aware of such efforts by aircraft manufacturers, airlines, and the FAA. As Quaid points out, we don’t have a major airline crash every day, and we do have the equivalent in deaths from medical errors. Many of which could be fixed by Computerized Physician Order Entry (CPOE).

Or ask the Mayo Clinic: Continue reading

Trust the Doctor, or Trust the Doctor’s Report Card?

What can be done about the huge medical error fatality problem Dennis Quaid identified when his baby twins were almost killed? Electronic medical records (EMR) are a start. Then as Kent Bottles suggests, let’s use those records to improve physician care:
“Dr. Kim A. Adcock, the radiology chief at Kaiser Permanente Colorado, created a system that misses one-third fewer cancers on mammograms and “has achieved what experts say is nearly as high a level of accuracy as mammography can offer.” At the heart of the program was his willingness to keep score and confront his doctors with their results. He had to fire three radiologists who missed too many cancers, and he had to reassign 8 doctors who were not reading enough films to stay sharp.”
We could use more report cards for physicians, including firing ones with failing grades, and maybe even paying the really good ones more, or at least getting them to teach the others.

-jsq

Dennis Quaid: Medical negligence deaths as many as a major airline crash every day

People think Internet security is bad (it is), but let’s look at medical security:
“Actor Dennis Quaid has become an advocate for electronic medical records. In 2007 his 12 day old twins received a massive accidental overdose (10,000 units of heparin instead of 10 units), a near-fatal error that could have been prevented by the kind of bar code technology that the VA has been using for decades. (Yes, folks, sorry, a government institution was decades ahead of privatized healthcare on this.)”

“Quaid points out that the widely quote 100,000 accidental deaths every year from medical errors equates to a major airline crash every day.”

I point out that that’s three times the annual deaths from automobiles, and around #5 in leading causes of death in the U.S.

-jsq

Medical Metrics Considered Overrated

One of the presenters at Metricon 5.0 was comparing IT security to other fields in various aspects of metrics and monitoring. I mentioned I thought she was giving far too much green for good to the field of medicine. This provoked repeated back and forth later.

My point was that 150 years after the invention of epidemiology and 100 years after the discovery of bacterial transmission of disease, in medicine application of known preventive measures is so low that Atul Gawande of Harvard has gotten large (on the order of 30%) reductions in deaths from complications of surgery in many hospitals simply by getting them to use checklists for things like washing hands before surgery.

I have an elderly relative in a nursing home who can’t take pills whole due to some damage to nerves in her neck. Again and again visitors sent by the family discover nursing home staff trying to give her pills whole without grinding them up. Why? They don’t read instructions about her, and previous shifts don’t remind later shifts. This kind of communication problem is epidemic not only in nursing homes but in hospitals. I found my father in a diabetic coma because nurses hadn’t paid any attention to him being a diabetic and needing to eat frequently. Fortunately, a bit of honey brought him out of it. Even nurses readily acknowledge this problem, but it persists. I can rattle off many other examples.

To which someone responded, yes, but medicine has epidemiology, and Edward Tufte demonstrated in one of his books that that goes well beyond checklists in to actual analysis, as in a physician’s discovery of a well in London being he source of cholera. I responded, yes, John Snow, in 1854: that was the first thing I said when I stood up to address this. But who now applies what he learned? One-shot longitudinal studies are not the same as ongoing monitoring with comparable metrics to show how well one group is doing compared to both the known science and to other groups.

Many people still didn’t get it, and kept referring to checklists as rudimentary.

So I tried again. If John Snow were alive today, he wouldn’t be prescribing statins for life to people with high blood pressure. He would be compiling data on who has high blood pressure and what they have been doing and eating before they got it. He would follow this evidence back to discover that one of the main contributors to high blood pressure, heart disease, and diabetes in the U.S. is high fructose corn syrup (HFCS). Then he would mount a political campaign to ban high fructose corn syrup, which would be the modern equivalent of his removal of the handle from the pump of the well that stopped the cholera.

To which someone replied, but there are political forces who would oppose that. And I said, yes, of course. Permit me to elaborate.

There were political forces in John Snow’s time, too, and he dealt with them:

Dr Snow took a sample of water from the pump, and, on examining it under a microscope, found that it contained “white, flocculent particles.” By 7 September, he was convinced that these were the source of infection, and he took his findings to the Board of Guardians of St James’s Parish, in whose parish the pump fell.

Though they were reluctant to believe him, they agreed to remove the pump handle as an experiment. When they did so, the spread of cholera dramatically stopped. [actually the outbreak had already lessened for several days]

Snow also investigated several outliers, all of which turned out to involve people actually travelling to the Soho well to get water.
Still no one believed Snow. A report by the Board of Health a few months later dismissed his “suggestions” that “the real cause of whatever was peculiar in the case lay in the general use of one particular well, situate [sic] at Broad Street in the middle of the district, and having (it was imagined) its waters contaminated by the rice-water evacuations of cholera patients. After careful inquiry,” the report concluded, “we see no reason to adopt this belief.”

So what had caused the cholera outbreak? The Reverend Henry Whitehead, vicar of St Luke’s church, Berwick Street, believed that it had been caused by divine intervention, and he undertook his own report on the epidemic in order to prove his point. However, his findings merely confirmed what Snow had claimed, a fact that he was honest enough to own up to. Furthermore, Whitehead helped Snow to isolate a single probable cause of the whole infection: just before the Soho epidemic had occurred, a child living at number 40 Broad Street had been taken ill with cholera symptoms, and its nappies had been steeped in water which was subsequently tipped into a leaking cesspool situated only three feet from the Broad Street well.

Whitehead’s findings were published in The Builder a year later, along with a report on living conditions in Soho, undertaken by the magazine itself. They found that no improvements at all had been made during the intervening year. “Even in Broad-street it would appear that little has since been done… In St Anne’s-Place, and St Anne’s-Court, the open cesspools are still to be seen; in the court, so far as we could learn, no change has been made; so that here, in spite of the late numerous deaths, we have all the materials for a fresh epidemic… In some [houses] the water-butts were in deep cellars, close to the undrained cesspool… The overcrowding appears to increase…” The Builder went on to recommend “the immediate abandonment and clearing away of all cesspools — not the disguise of them, but their complete removal.”

Nothing much was done about it. Soho was to remain a dangerous place for some time to come.

John Snow didn’t shy away from politics. He was successful in getting the local politicians to agree to his first experiment, which was successful in helping end that outbreak of cholera. He even drew his biggest opponent into doing research, which ended up confirming Snow’s epidemiological diagnosis and extending it further to find the original probable source of infection of the well. But even that didn’t suffice for motivating enough political will to fix the problem.

From which I draw two conclusions:

  1. Even John Snow is over-rated. Sure, he found the problem, but he didn’t get it fixed longterm.

  2. Why not? Because that would require ongoing monitoring of likely sources of infection (which sort of happened) compared to actual incidents of disease (which does not appear to have happened), together with eliminating the known likely sources.
Eliminating likely known sources is what Dr. Gawande’s checklist is about, 150 years later, which was my original point. And the ongoing monitoring and comparisons appear not to be happening, even yet.

As someone at Metricon said, who will watch the watchers? I responded, yes, that’s it!

One-shot longitudinal studies can create great information. That’s what John Snow did. That’s what much of scientific experiment is about. But even when you repeat the experiment to confirm it, that’s not the same as ongoing monitoring. And it’s not the same as checklists to ensure application of what was learned in the experiment.

What is really needed is longitudinal experiments combined checklists, plus ongoing monitoring, plus new analysis derived from the monitoring data. That’s at least four levels. All of them are needed. Modern medicine often only manages the first. And in the case of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS), until recently even the first was lacking, and most of the experiments that have happened until very recently have not come from the country with the biggest HFCS health problem, namely the U.S. A third of the entire U.S. population is obese, and another third is overweight, with concomittant epidemics of heart disease, diabetes, and high blood pressure. And the medical profession prescribes statins for life instead of getting to the root of the problem and fixing it.

Yes, I think the field of medicine gets rated too much green for good.

And if IT security wants to improve its own act, it also needs all four levels, not just the first or the second.

-jsq

Medical Object Panopticon: Hospital Real-Time Location System (RTLS)

carolina_logo.gif Mostly increased monitoring provokes privacy concerns. But what if it’s objects that are being monitored?

Carolinas HealthCare System (CHS), the third-largest public healthcare system in the US, has completed the first phase of an asset tracking program that is believed to be one of the largest healthcare real-time location system (RTLS) deployments in the US. Currently about 5,000 assets are being tracked over 1.4 million square feet at five facilities.

CHS plans to extend the WiFi-based RTLS system throughout its network, which includes 15 hospitals and medical centers in the Carolinas. Additional facilities totaling about 3 million square feet are scheduled to go live by the end of the quarter.

"As a healthcare organization, we’re required to upgrade or perform preventive maintenance regularly on medical equipment," Clay Fisher, director of information service at Carolinas HealthSystem, told RFID Update. "Imagine trying to find one specific IV pump when you have thousands of them across multiple facilities. We have reduced our ‘time-to-find’ for individual pieces of equipment from hours to less than ten minutes."

Carolinas HealthCare Launches Huge RTLS System, RFID Update, Tuesday October 9th, 2007

One odd side effect is that CHS says if your wireless network isn’t configured for VoIP, you should add that, because then it will have enough coverage to do RTLS.

Now if they can find a way to track patient orders between nursing shifts, and which doctors sign off on drugs without seeing their patients….

-jsq