The FCC has required extension of CALEA to VoIP. An all-star cast of Internet security and protocol people beg to differ:

In order to extend authorized interception much beyond the easy scenario, it is necessary either to eliminate the flexibility that Internet communications allow, or else introduce serious security risks to domestic VoIP implementations. The former would have significant negative effects on U.S. ability to innovate, while the latter is simply dangerous. The current FBI and FCC direction on CALEA applied to VoIP carries great risks.

Security Implications of Applying the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act to Voice over IP, by Steve Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Ernie Brickell, Clint Brooks, Vint Cerf, Whit Diffie, Susan Landau, Jon Peterson, John Treichler.

Which is more valuable? A free, extensible, and relatively secure Internet, or one controled by a state?

Which is worse? An Internet controled by a few big telcos, or an Internet controled by a state?

Of course, if we remember Minitel, there may be no real difference. Minitel, the France Telecom all-France network that held France back for several years behind even the rest of Europe, which was held back by the national and EU-backed OSI protocol implementation while the U.S. was surging forward with TCP/IP and the Internet.

Will the FCC and Congress hobble the Internet in the U.S.?

-jsq

PS: Seen on Dave Farber’s Interesting People list.