Monthly Archives: September 2004

Denial and Damage

Denial can cause damage.

In the summer of 1953 tornados had damaged several states, but everyone knew Massachusetts didn’t have tornados.

“The official forecast for Central Massachusetts called for a continuation of hot, humid weather with the likelihood of afternoon thunderstorms, some possibly severe. US Weather Bureau storm forecasters believed there was the potential for tornadoes in New York and New England that afternoon and evening. The Buffalo, New York office warned western New York residents of the possibility for a tornado, but the official forecast released from the Boston office did not mention the threat, based in part on the rarity of Massachusetts tornadoes, and perhaps partly on the potential psychological impact on those residing in the area.”
“Weather Almanac for June 2003: THE WORCESTER TORNADO OF 1953”
Keith C. Heidorn, PhD, THE WEATHER DOCTOR, June 1, 2003

Even after the funnel touched down in Worcester County on June 9 1953, forecasters at the Boston Weather Bureau office at Logan airport discounted telephone calls from the affected area, dismissing them as crank calls. After all, everyone knew Mass. didn’t have tornados.

Meanwhile, debris started falling 35 miles east of the funnel, some onto Harvard’s Blue Hill Meteorological Observatory. Not just small pieces, either: 6 foot planks and 10 foot square pieces of wall and roof, The Harvard observers managed to convince Logan to put out a new advisory. I don’t know if they waved a plank at the telephone.

But the damage had been done. It was too late to evacuate, tape windows, or take cover. “The damage was estimated at $52 million ($349 million in 2002 dollars) and included 4,000 buildings and hundreds of cars.” The picture on the left from the Worcester Telegram and Gazette is of freshman Senator John F. Kennedy touring the disaster area.

It was an F4 (some say F5) tornado, with winds up to 250 miles per hour. Yet denial was so great that trained meteorologists refused to believe the funnel existed while it was flinging cars into the air, demolishing houses, and throwing debris as far as 50 miles away; a mattress was found in Boston Harbor.

“”When people see damage, is when they start acting.”
–Darin Figurskey, meteorologist
quoted in “The Wrath of God” on The History Channel

Affected parties moved quickly to start a state-wide storm-spotting network to watch for future storms. They even did some historical research. It turns out Mass. actually has about 3 tornados per year, and the earliest one on record was reported in June 1643 by Governor Winthrop. It’s amazing what you can see when you stop denying that you can see it, and even more when you have multiple eyes watching.

Several people affected by the Worcester tornado went on to pioneer tornado chasing, tornado cataloguing, and Doppler radar. The Weather Doctor has more on them and the Worcester tornado.

It seems the best time to make risk management plans is before the disaster happens.

-jsq

Fear is not Security

James Seng points out Bruce Schneier’s essay, “How Long Can the Country Stay Scared?”, in which Bruce remarks,

“There are two basic ways to terrorize people. The first is to do something spectacularly horrible, like flying airplanes into skyscrapers and killing thousands of people. The second is to keep people living in fear.”

In a previous post I noted that the ancient Anasazi tried to deal with a terrible enemy by retreating to fortified residences on increasingly hard to reach cliffs.

Who was this enemy that attacked the Anasazi, killing them and eating them? Apparently there was no large external invading force; it would have left traces
that would have been found by now. The best theory as to who the attackers were appears to be: the Anasazi themselves. The Anasazi society apparently fragmented and warred with itself, producing a state of fear that continued for decades if not centuries.

That society with a chronic state of fear and fortification failed. It eventually abandoned the cliff dwellings.

The survivors mutated into a society of mesa-dwellers who protected themselves via superior observation and cooperation. They apparently kept watchers on the mesa tops who could real perils approaching and alert people on the same and neighboring mesas in time to do something specific, rather than keeping everyone in fear all the time.

Hm, sounds like a holistic and synoptic view of the surrounding territory.

-jsq

Government mandates in networking and security

Phil Libin remarks, regarding a recent White House common ID mandate for federal employees and contractors:

“Just as with the development of the Internet, the federal government is once again the main initial catalyst for new technology that’s going to change the foundations of mainstream business transactions in the near future.”

Indeed, ARPA (now DARPA) funded the early ARPANET, which led to the Internet, and DCA (now DISA), among other agencies, promoted it by buying equipment from fledgling Internet vendors.

However, let’s not forget that the federal government also promulgated GOSIP, which was a requirement that computer systems sold to the federal government had to support the ISO-OSI protocol suite, which was similar to TCP/IP but different. Different in that while TCP/IP was the result of a process of multiple implementations interacting with standardization, ISO-OSI was a product of standards committees, and lacked not only many implementations, but even more many users. GOSIP was a waste of time and money. Fortunately, the U.S. government wasn’t as serious about ISO-OSI as were many European governments and the EU; in Europe OSI held back internetworking until the rapid deployment of the Internet in the U.S. and elsewhere eventually made it clear that OSI was going nowhere.

Where the U.S. government succeeded in networking was in promoting research, development, implementation, and deployment. Where it failed was when it tried to mandate a technical choice.

Hm, I see the White House directive gives the Dept. of Commerce six months to consult with other government agencies and come up with a standard. If there’s a requirement to consult with industry or academia, I don’t see it.

I hope this comes out better than, for example, key escrow, a previous government attempt to mandate authentication methods.

-jsq